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THE ROBERT L. LEVINE 
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE 
INCOME DISPARITY, GENDER EQUALITY, 
AND FREE EXPRESSION 
Sylvia A. Law* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the past half century, our world has experienced a radical change 
comparable to the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century.  At least 
five elements are key:  growing disparity of human opportunity, advance of 
formal human rights and equality, information transformation, economic 
globalization, and climate change.  My focus is on economic disparity and 
gender equality in the United States.  These two issues, huge in and of 
themselves, interact with the other cataclysmic changes of our time. 
I came to law teaching in the early 1970s from civil rights work with poor 
people.  For many years, I taught first-year Torts.  Ben Zipursky,1 organizer 
of this conference and now a Torts professor himself, was one of many 
fabulous students.  At the end of each semester, I offered some thoughts on 
the meaning of life in the law: 
One fact, more than any other, influences the personal and professional 
choices facing lawyers and law students today and the collective choices 
that we face as a society.  It is that we live in a world in which there are 
gross disparities in the distribution of money, political power, and personal 
opportunity for significant life choices.2 
 
*  Professor Emerita, NYU School of Law.  I am grateful to many knowledgeable people who 
shared ideas on this talk and paper.  The errors or misjudgments are my own.  Thanks to Arthur 
Garfield Hays Fellows Seminar, Deborah Ellis, Chai Feldblum, Janice Goodman, Helen 
Hershkoff, Nan Hunter, Evelyn Murphy, and Stephanie Wildman.  I am most especially 
grateful to my magnificent research assistant, Carmen Tellez, NYU Law 2019, and my faculty 
assistant, Kellene O’Hara.  These remarks were delivered in conjunction with the Symposium 
entitled Gender Equality and the First Amendment, hosted by the Fordham Law Review on 
November 1–2, 2018, at Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview of the 
Symposium, see Jeanmarie Fenrich, Benjamin C. Zipursky & Danielle Keats Citron, 
Foreword:  Gender Equality and the First Amendment, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2019). 
 
 1. Benjamin C. Zipursky, James H. Quinn ’49 Chair in Legal Ethics, Fordham Law 
School, and organizer of this Symposium. 
 2. Sylvia A. Law, The Messages of Legal Education, in LOOKING AT LAW SCHOOL 155, 
155–56 (Stephen Gilles ed., 1977). 
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I bemoaned the fact that the top fifth of the population receives 40 percent of 
income, while the bottom fifth only 5 percent.3  While the situation was 
infinitely worse for those at the bottom, even those who made it to the top 
were not secure because life is unpredictable. 
These disparities were profoundly disturbing in 1973.  Today, the years 
from the end of World War II into the mid-1970s are remembered as a period 
of economic equality, substantial growth, and broadly shared prosperity.4  
Incomes grew rapidly and at similar rates across the income ladder, roughly 
doubling in inflation-adjusted dollars.5  The income gap between high-
income people and those on the middle and lower rungs did not change 
much.6  In 1973, the average CEO earned 22.3 times as much as the average 
worker.7  By 2013, the average CEO earned 295.9 times as much as the 
average worker.8  During that period, the maximum marginal tax rate on 
individual income fell from 70 percent to 37 percent.9  What happened? 
I.  GROWING INCOME INEQUALITY 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, economic growth slowed and the income gap 
widened.  Income growth for middle- and lower-income households slowed 
sharply, while incomes at the top grew fast.  The concentration of income at 
the very top rose to unprecedented levels not seen since the Gilded Age of 
the Roaring Twenties.10  By 2015, the top 1 percent of households earned 
one-fifth of the nation’s income; wealth inequality is even greater with the 
top 1 percent owning approximately 38 percent of the nation’s wealth.11 
Today, the much publicized good news is that, in 2017, the median U.S. 
household income rose for a third straight year, by 1.8 percent to $61,372,12 
 
 3. Id. at 156. 
 4. See CHAD STONE ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, A GUIDE TO STATISTICS 
ON HISTORICAL TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY 1 (2018). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id.  See generally MARK BLYTH, AUSTERITY:  THE HISTORY OF A DANGEROUS IDEA 
(2013). 
 7. LAWRENCE MISHEL & ALYSSA DAVIS, ECON. POL’Y INST., CEO PAY CONTINUES TO 
RISE AS TYPICAL WORKERS ARE PAID LESS 3–7 (2014). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Robert H. Frank, How Rising Income Inequality Threatens Access to the Legal System, 
148 DAEDALUS 10, 14 (2019). 
 10. Michele E. Gilman, En-Gendering Economic Inequality, 32 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 
1, 7 (2016). 
 11. Id. at 3.  In 2015, the top 1 percent received 17 percent of the nation’s income before 
federal taxes and transfers and 13 percent after. STONE ET AL., supra note 4, at 13.  The Federal 
Reserve estimates that in 2016 the top 1 percent of the population owned 38.6 percent of the 
nation’s wealth. Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016:  
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 103 FED. RES. BULL., Sept. 2017, at 1, 10 
(“The wealth share of the top 1 percent climbed from 36.3 percent in 2013 to 38.6 percent in 
2016, slightly surpassing the wealth share of the next highest 9 percent of families 
combined.”). 
 12. KAYLA FONTENOT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED 
STATES:  2017, at 4 (2018). 
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the highest on record since 1967.13  The reassuring news about rising income 
is distorted in many ways.  First, it does not take into account even sharper 
increases in the costs of basic life essentials, particularly the costs of housing.  
In the past twenty years, the prices for daily goods—food, housing, 
transportation, and education—have increased faster than inflation, giving 
the dollar less buying power.14  The Consumer Price Index (CPI) maintained 
by the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics measures the average price change 
over time of all consumer products purchased in urban areas, where 
approximately 90 percent of the U.S. population lives.15  For example, as of 
July 2018, basic consumer products that would have cost $20 in 1998 would 
now cost $31.16 
Consider the costs of housing.  In the twenty-first century, the costs of 
housing have risen faster than incomes, at over double the speed of wages.17  
Home prices are up 6.1 percent annually, while wages are increasing 2.4 
percent a year.18  Rental cost increases are similar.  In 2015, the CPI for rent 
of a primary residence increased 3.5 percent annually, outpacing the overall 
index’s rates.19  In 2018, rental costs increased an average of 3.7 percent, 
while wages for that same time period only rose 2.7 percent.20  The “housing 
wage” describes the relationship between income and housing costs.21  What 
full-time hourly wage does a person need to earn to rent a modest one-
bedroom apartment?  Nationally, the 2017 housing wage was $21.21, which 
is 2.9 times the federal minimum wage.22  The statistics are even bleaker in 
 
 13. Id. (“With this adjustment, the 2017 real median household income is not statistically 
different from the estimates in any year between 1998 and 2001 or 2005 through 2007, but is 
higher than all other years since 1967.”). 
 14. How Does the Current Cost of Living Compare to 20 Years Ago?, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 
10, 2019), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/101314/what-does-current-cost-living-
compare-20-years-ago.asp [https://perma.cc/9EUA-Q9S3]. 
 15. Will Kenton, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), INVESTOPEDIA 
(Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cpiu.asp [https://perma.cc/G7VT-
8YY7]. 
 16. How Does the Current Cost of Living Compare to 20 Years Ago?, supra note 14. 
 17. See, e.g., Mitchell Hartman, Home Prices Rise Much Faster Than Wages and 
Consumer Prices, MARKETPLACE (Nov. 28, 2017, 6:55 AM), https://www.marketplace.org/ 
2017/11/28/economy/home-prices-rise-much-faster-wages-and-consumer-prices 
[https://perma.cc/G5Y4-MPTM]. 
 18. See id.; see also Press Release, S&P Dow Jones Indices, The S&P CoreLogic Case-




 19. Jeffrey Sparshott, Rising Rents Outpace Wages in Wide Swaths of the U.S., WALL 
ST. J. (July 28, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rising-rents-outpace-wages-in-wide-
swaths-of-the-u-s-1438117026 [https://perma.cc/2VZV-YQU4]. 
 20. Andrea Riquier, Rents Are Still Growing Much Faster Than Wages, Even as Growth 
Cools Slightly, MARKETWATCH (June 13, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/rents-
are-still-growing-much-faster-than-wages-even-as-growth-cools-slightly-2018-06-12 
[https://perma.cc/ELA2-9UP9]. 
 21. ANDREW AURAND ET AL., NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 2017:  THE 
HIGH COST OF HOUSING 1 (2017). 
 22. Id. 
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localities with low housing stock, rising rent prices, or stagnant wages.23  
While housing in the private market becomes more costly, federal support 
for housing for low-income people, through Section 8 vouchers24 or public 
housing,25 has fallen sharply. 
Good news about modestly rising income is also misleading because the 
private costs of education have increased exponentially.  In 2016, the average 
cost of a four-year college education was $104,480, while the comparable 
cost for a four-year degree in 1989 was $26,902 ($52,892 adjusted for 
inflation).26  The burden of student loans is now a bigger share of consumer 
debt than either credit cards or auto loans.27  The quality of primary and 
secondary education in the United States has fallen, even as a growing global 
economy makes education more essential.28  Caring parents scramble to 
educate their children, but most lack the income to supplement inadequate 
public schools or to relocate to neighborhoods where schools are better.  In 
addition to failing to account for the rising costs of essential services, general 
data on rising income ignores disparities based on gender, race, and other 
factors.  In 2017, the median annual earnings in the United States for women 
and men working full-time and year-round were $41,977 and $52,146, 
 
 23. For example, in San Francisco, a person needs to earn $179,529 to rent the average 
available apartment, while in Phoenix the figure is only $41,057 and in Detroit, $46,586. 
Derek Miller, The Income Needed to Pay Rent in the Largest U.S. Cities—2017 Edition, 
SMARTASSET (Sept. 20, 2018), https://smartasset.com/mortgage/the-income-needed-to-pay-
rent-2017-edition [https://perma.cc/YLF7-KT7E]. 
 24. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is authorized to 
provide housing assistance, including housing choice vouchers, under section 8 of the U.S. 
Housing Act of 1937. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN OVERVIEW OF THE SECTION 8 HOUSING 
PROGRAMS:  HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS AND PROJECT-BASED RENTAL ASSISTANCE 1 (2014).  
The Trump administration has proposed cuts to HUD’s Section 8 programs. See, e.g., 
DOUGLAS RICE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, CONGRESS SHOULD INCREASE HUD 
FUNDING IN 2019 TO PREVENT VOUCHER CUTS, HELP CHILDREN ESCAPE POVERTY 2 (2018); 
Glenn Thrush, As Affordable Housing Crisis Grows, HUD Sits on the Sidelines, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/us/politics/hud-affordable-housing-
crisis.html [https://perma.cc/BM37-E6D4]. 
 25. In the past two decades, the number of public housing units fell by 250,000, while 
need increased. Public Housing, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 2 (Nov. 15, 2017), 
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/policybasics-housing.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
BP43-QHAF]. 
 26. Camilo Maldonado, Price of College Increasing Almost 8 Times Faster Than Wages, 
FORBES (July 24, 2018, 8:23 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/camilomaldonado/2018/07/ 
24/price-of-college-increasing-almost-8-times-faster-than-wages/ [https://perma.cc/A5PW-
MGR2]. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Drew DeSilver, U.S. Students’ Academic Achievement Still Lags That of Their 
Peers in Many Other Countries, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 15, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/15/u-s-students-internationally-math-science 
[https://perma.cc/3QJ4-9LJ3].  In 2015, the Programme for International Student Assessment 
tested fifteen-year-olds in seventy-one developed and developing countries and placed the 
United States thirty-eighth in math and twenty-forth in science and literacy. Id.  Among the 
thirty-five members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the 
United States ranked thirtieth in math and ninetieth in science. Id. 
2019] INCOME DISPARITY AND GENDER EQUALITY 2483 
respectively, a gender pay gap of 20 percent.29  The gap compounds over a 
lifetime, follows women into retirement, and impacts Social Security and 
pensions.30 
The racial pay gap is even greater than the gender gap.  In 2015, black 
men’s average hourly wages were 31 percent lower than all men’s.31  More 
disturbingly, except for a brief narrowing in the late 1990s, the racial pay gap 
between black and white workers has remained stable or increased for nearly 
forty years.32  In 2017, while median household income for white, non-
Hispanic households rose 2.6 percent to $68,145, it fell 0.2 percent to 
$40,258 for African American households.33 
While the Fordham celebration and this paper focus on women, that 
category includes women of many colors, ethnicities, religions, sexual 
identities and orientations, classes, nationalities, ages, and more.  Each of 
these categories is consequential and deserves its own careful examination.  
Use of the category “woman” hides complexity and, more insidiously, could 
reduce “woman” to white women of relative privilege.34  At the same time, 
“‘[c]ognitively, we need simplifying categories, and the unifying category of 
“woman” helps to organize experience, even at the cost of denying some of 
it.’  Abandoning mental categories completely would leave us . . . terrorized 
by the sheer weight and particularity of experience.”35 
II.  FEDERAL LAWS PROHIBITING GENDER PAY DISCRIMINATION AND 
THE REMEDIES TO ENFORCE THEM ARE WEAK 
Before examining the detail of the cultural and legal commitment to equal 
pay for equal work, consider the experiences of two women who eventually 
won claims for equal pay. 
Lilly Ledbetter was a supervisor at a Goodyear tire plant in Alabama for 
nineteen years, from 1979 to 1998, when she received an anonymous note 
informing her that her less experienced male colleagues earned a lot more.36  
Her pay was initially in line with her coworkers, but by 1997, Ledbetter was 
the only woman working as an area manager and the pay discrepancy 
 
 29. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP:  
FALL 2018 EDITION 7 (2018). 
 30. Id. at 5. 
 31. VALERIE WILSON & WILLIAM M. RODGERS III, ECON. POL’Y INST., BLACK-WHITE 
WAGE GAPS EXPAND WITH RISING WAGE INEQUALITY 1, 3 (2016). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id.; see also Katanga Johnson, U.S. Incomes Rose but Inequality Widened in 2017:  
Data, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2018, 12:03 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-economy-
poverty/u-s-incomes-rose-but-inequality-widened-in-2017-data-idUSKCN1LS2HX 
[https://perma.cc/Y3HU-UQXA]. 
 34. For a classic statement of the issues, see generally Angela P. Harris, Race and 
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990). 
 35. Id. at 607 (quoting Martha Minow, Feminist Reason:  Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 47, 51 (1988)). 
 36. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 643 (2007) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). 
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between her and her fifteen male counterparts was stark.37  She was paid 
$3727 per month; the lowest-paid male area manager received $4286 per 
month, and the highest-paid man in the same position was paid $5236.38  She 
sued under federal law, and in 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision 
held that the 180-day statute of limitations barred her from claiming relief for 
decades of discrimination.39  Justice Ginsburg, dissenting for four, would 
have held that the discrimination was ongoing and cumulative.40  Congress, 
following Ginsburg’s advice, passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009.41  The vote was along party lines, except for five Republican senators, 
including four Republican women Senators, who supported Ledbetter.42  On 
January 29, 2009, it was the first bill that newly elected President Obama 
signed into law.43 
A second woman, Carrie Gracie, grew up in Scotland, graduated from 
Oxford University, and began work at the BBC in 1987.44  Four years later, 
she became the BBC World Service’s correspondent in China, threw herself 
into Chinese life, became fluent, married a Chinese musician, and had two 
children.45  In 1997, the BBC promoted her to Beijing bureau chief.46  She 
was the main breadwinner of the family.47  When Gracie’s daughter 
developed leukemia, they returned to England for medical care.48  Gracie 
worked at the BBC as an anchorperson and continued to cover China from 
abroad, producing a Peabody Award–winning documentary on the 
transformation of a rural community.49  In 2013, the BBC offered her the 
position as chief China editor.50  Her children were teenagers settled in 
England, but she loved the work.51  She sought and got assurance that her 
pay would be equal to colleagues in equivalent posts in other parts of the 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 621 (majority opinion). 
 40. Id. at 647–50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 41. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (codified in 
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 42. S. 181 (111th):  Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2009/s14 [https://perma.cc/8XKT-76JJ] (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 43. Remarks on Signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 1 PUB. PAPERS 22 (Jan. 
29, 2009). 
 44. See Jane Martinson, Carrie Gracie:  Fearless Leader of Battle for Equal Pay at the 
BBC, GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/jan/14/carrie-
gracie-fearless-leader-of-battle-for-equal-pay-at-bbc [https://perma.cc/Y23H-X5BS]; see 
also Ben Dowell, Carrie Gracie Profile:  Award-Winning Journalist with Years at World 
Service, GUARDIAN (May 12, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2009/may/12/ 
carrie-gracie-bbc-news-salary-profile [https://perma.cc/867K-4EF5]. 
 45. Lauren Collins, How the BBC Women Are Working Toward Equal Pay, NEW YORKER 
(July 23, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/07/23/how-the-bbc-women-are-
working-toward-equal-pay [https://perma.cc/YBQ3-CEDY]. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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world.52  In 2017, the British government required the publicly funded BBC 
to publish a list of high earners.53  The two male chief foreign editors were 
on the list.54  Gracie and the other woman chief foreign editor were not.55  
The women earned 50 percent less than their male colleagues.56  Gracie 
protested by saying that she was not asking to be paid more, only to be paid 
equally.57  After months of wrangling, the BBC apologized and paid her back 
wages, which she donated to the Fawcett Society, a British women’s rights 
organization providing legal advice and strategic support for women seeking 
equal pay.58 
Violations of legal and cultural equal pay norms are common.  A culture 
of pay secrecy often makes it impossible to know whether there is a violation.  
The money matters, especially for the majority who struggle financially.  But 
it is not only about the money.  As Carrie Gracie put it, she felt as though her 
male bosses had a naked picture of her in their office and laughed every time 
they saw it, saying:  “It is the humiliation and shame of feeling that they 
regarded you as second class.”59  Pay secrecy is not the only problem.  Even 
with information, there are other obstacles, both substantive and procedural, 
to redress violations of equal pay norms. 
Civil rights advocates have traditionally looked to federal laws and courts 
to enforce equality norms.  This Part briefly examines the federal laws 
bearing on pay equality and the remedies available to enforce those laws.  It 
finds them seriously deficient.  Further, for the foreseeable future, the most 
that advocates for civil rights and equality can expect from federal courts is 
adherence to established precedent and enforcement of clearly articulated 
federal laws.  That is not nothing, but more is needed and possible paths 
forward are explored in Part III. 
Since 1963, a year before the historic Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal 
Equal Pay Act has made it illegal to pay men and women different wages for 
equal work.60  The core liberal principle of equal pay for women and men 
who do equal work commands broad public support, even among those who 
reject feminism and women’s liberation.61  In 1964, Congress prohibited 
discrimination in voting, public accommodations, education, and 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Amie Tsang, BBC Apologizes to Carrie Gracie, Former China Editor, over Unequal 
Pay, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/29/business/media/bbc-
gender-pay-carrie-gracie.html [https://perma.cc/XV7W-HA4B]. 
 59. Collins, supra note 45. 
 60. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) 
(2012)). 
 61. See Most Americans Support Equal Pay for Men and Women, RASMUSSEN REP. (Apr. 
13, 2018), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/business/jobs_employment/ 
april_2018/most_americans_support_equal_pay_for_men_and_women [http://perma.cc/ 
82LW-TURS] (finding in a nationwide survey that 67 percent of adults support a California 
law requiring equal pay for men and women for substantially similar work). 
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employment on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, as well 
as discrimination in employment on the basis of sex.62  The 1964 Civil Rights 
Act was a response to the massive movement for basic civil rights for the 
African American descendants of those brought to the United States as 
slaves.63  Title VII is broader than the Equal Pay Act, both in terms of groups 
covered and forms of discrimination prohibited.64 
When the Equal Pay Act was adopted in 1963, women earned 59 cents on 
the male dollar,65 and today they earn 80 cents.66  But that ratio has been 
stalled for almost thirty years.67  Factors, other than the federal equal pay 
law, contribute to the reduction of the gender pay gap; most importantly, 
changes in higher education.  Between 1970 and 2010, the proportion of 
women undergraduates rose from 42 percent to 57 percent, while the 
proportion of women graduate students grew from 35 percent to 59 percent, 
and the proportion of women in medicine, law, and business shot up from 
9 percent to 47 percent.68  Women are now more educated than men, but they 
still earn less.69  Why does the disparity persist?  Three factors seem most 
important.  First, work is segregated by gender.70  To put it simply, men are 
more likely to be plumbers and women, nurses and teachers.71  Traditional 
 
 62. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 63. The prohibition on sex discrimination was included at a late stage.  People dispute 
whether it was a segregationist effort to defeat the bill with the “ridiculous” idea that women 
should be treated equally under the law or an astute move by politically unified feminists. See, 
e.g., Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1014–20 
(2015).  Schultz documents the standard popular and scholarly story that the addition of “sex” 
was a conservative Southern effort to defeat the bill and offers an alternative story that the 
National Women’s Party, and lawyer-activist Pauli Murray, organized to push for a narrow, 
but important, version of equality for working women. Id.  The effort was helped by the 1963 
publication of Betty Friedan’s best-selling book, The Feminine Mystique. Id. at 1017. 
 64. Since 1979, the enforcement of the Equal Pay Act rests with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency responsible for enforcing Title VII, as well as 
the Department of Justice and Department of Labor. See Civil Rights Center (CRC), U.S. 
DEP’T LAB., http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/crc/about-crc.htm [https://perma.cc/KLZ7-
8AMR] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes [https://perma.cc/W889-5DEZ] (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2019); Laws Enforced by the Employment Litigation Section, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/laws-enforced-employment-litigation-section [https://perma.cc/ 
M5EL-M395] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 65. About NCPE, NAT’L COMMISSION ON PAY EQUITY, https://www.pay-
equity.org/about.html [https://perma.cc/G7LR-FZBN] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 66. JASMINE TUCKER, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., WOMEN EXPERIENCE A WAGE GAP IN 
NEARLY EVERY OCCUPATION 1 (2018). 
 67. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 29, at 5. 
 68. Degrees Conferred by Degree-Granting Institutions, by Level of Degree and Sex of 
Student:  Selected Years, 1869–70 Through 2020–21, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_283.asp [https://perma.cc/UN8B-7M2C] 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 69. See, e.g., Jillian Berman, Millennial Women Are More Educated Than Men, but Are 
Still Paid Less, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 11, 2015, 9:05 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/ 
story/millennial-women-are-more-educated-than-men-but-are-still-paid-less-2015-04-08 
[https://perma.cc/T5YN-FDY6]. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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male jobs pay more.72  Second, women take greater responsibility for 
childcare and are assumed to be less valuable as workers.  This raises 
complex issues.  But, “42 percent of mothers with children under the age of 
18 are their families’ primary or sole breadwinners.”73  Assumptions that 
men deserve more because they are the primary or sole family support no 
longer describe the way we live.  Even women without children experience 
gender pay disparity.74  The third explanation for the gender wage disparity 
is discrimination, and that has long been illegal. 
Substantively, the U.S. federal requirements for gender-based wage 
equality are weak under both the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act.  
Most courts have interpreted both statutes to require a wage comparison 
between a man and a woman doing near-identical work.75  Finding a 
comparable employee who meets the requirement for “equal work” is further 
complicated by changes to workplaces resulting from the new economy.  
“[I]n today’s workplaces, routine duties have become increasingly 
mechanized or outsourced, with the remaining employees performing varied 
and discretionary tasks.”76  As fewer people perform identical tasks in a 
particular workplace, it is more difficult to identify an identical male 
counterpart. 
Even if a woman identifies a man in the same establishment who does 
identical work and is paid more, the federal law allows the employer to show 
that the pay difference for near-identical work is supported by a “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason”77 or by any “factor other than sex.”78  Judicial 
interpretation of these defenses has given employers wide latitude to “derail 
equal pay claims by allowing any facially neutral factor to justify paying 
women less than men for performing equal work.”79 
In the 1980s, the stubborn persistence of the gender pay gap and the 
perceived weakness of federal equal pay standards led many feminists, and 
some unions and states, to advocate a broader concept of pay equity.  
“Comparable worth” builds on the observation that work in the United States 
is highly sex-segregated, and the work typically done by women is paid less 
than work done by men.80  Under comparable worth theory, “sex-based wage 
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 73. Id. at 6. 
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ON LEGIS. 385, 400 (2013). 
 75. Stephanie Bornstein, Equal Work, 77 MD. L. REV. 581, 609 (2018). 
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 78. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(4) (2012); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2012); Deborah L. 
Brake, Reviving Paycheck Fairness:  Why and How the Factor-Other-Than-Sex Defense 
Matters, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 889, 890–91 (2016). 
 79. Brake, supra note 78, at 891. 
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Future of Comparable Worth Theory, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 99, 100 (1984).  See generally Paul 
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discrimination exists if employees in job classifications occupied primarily 
by women are paid less than employees in job classifications filled primarily 
by men, if the jobs are of equal value to the employer, though otherwise 
dissimilar.”81  Employers would be required to pay equal wages for different 
jobs that are comparable in value but filled predominantly by women and 
men, respectively.  But the question of equal value is obviously complex and 
deeply gendered. 
Advocates of comparable worth claims recognized that the Equal Pay Act 
was not helpful, so they argued that Title VII’s broader language prohibiting 
pay discrimination “on the basis of sex” supported such claims.  During the 
Carter administration, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) Chair, Eleanor Holmes Norton, supported the concept.82  Ronald 
Reagan appointed Clarence Thomas as EEOC Chair and he, of course, 
rejected the idea.83  Elections matter. 
In 1981 in County of Washington v. Gunther,84 the U.S. Supreme Court, 
in a 5-4 decision, held that Title VII’s prohibitions against sex discrimination 
in pay could be read more broadly than those in the Equal Pay Act.85  The 
county paid male prison guards more than female prison guards.86  
Recognizing that the work demanded was not identical, the county hired 
consultants to advise it whether the pay disparities were justified by 
differences in the nature of the work.87  The experts recommended that the 
women guards be paid 90 percent of the male wage.88  The county rejected 
the recommendation and offered the women 70 percent.89  The issue before 
the Court was whether Title VII prohibited a broader range of pay equality 
claims than that allowed by the Equal Pay Act.90  Justice William J. Brennan, 
writing for the majority, found that “the failure of the county to pay [the 
female guards] the full evaluated worth of their jobs can be proven to be 
attributable to intentional sex discrimination.”91  In his dissent, Justice 
William Rehnquist protested that the majority opened the door to 
“comparable worth” claims under Title VII.92  Even Brennan, for the 
majority, denied that it was adopting “the controversial concept of 
‘comparable worth.’”93 
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The modest promise of Gunther was not realized.  In a series of cases, 
public sector unions persuaded states to conduct studies to determine whether 
men and women were paid equally for work that was comparable in terms of 
education, training, skill, effort, responsibility, value to employers, and other 
factors.94  When the studies demonstrated that jobs dominated by women 
systematically paid less than comparable jobs dominated by men, and states 
refused to make the recommended pay adjustments, women sought relief in 
federal courts under Title VII.95  These claims were rejected.96  The courts 
relied on a “market defense” and held that, even where the employer 
conducted a pay equity study that exposed disparities by gender, setting pay 
using “prevailing market rates” did not constitute discrimination under Title 
VII.  Then–Ninth Circuit Judge Anthony Kennedy opined that “[n]either law 
nor logic deems the free market system a suspect enterprise.”97  Seventh 
Circuit Judge Richard Posner opined that “the issue of comparable worth . . . 
is not of the sort that judges are well equipped to resolve intelligently or that 
we should lightly assume has been given to us to resolve by Title VII or the 
Constitution.”98 
There are answers to these claims.  “Prevailing market rates” developed 
over centuries in which women and people of color were not recognized as 
full citizens or people, and were relegated to separate, inferior spheres.  Title 
VII was part of a larger civil rights movement rejecting those assumptions. 
Judges are paid to do hard work, interpreting and enforcing the law.  As 
conservative Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote in a different context, 
“Congress, as it frequently does, has voiced its wishes in muted strains and 
left it to the courts to discern the theme in the cacophony of political 
understanding.”99  Judges are expected to interpret and enforce complex 
laws.  Courts enforce the Sherman Act, even though the statute is far from 
precise and the factual issues are dauntingly complex.  The comparable worth 
concept, now rejected under federal law, is explored further in Part III. 
Procedural obstacles to the enforcement of pay equity norms are even more 
problematic than the weak substantive federal pay equality rules.100  Under 
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party to a civil claim is 
entitled to summary judgment, as a matter of law, if a complaint and answer 
raise no disputed genuine issue of material fact and the law is clear.101  Since 
the 1960s, there has been a steady and substantial increase in the rate of case 
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termination by summary judgment.102  Although summary judgment can be 
granted in favor of either a plaintiff or a defendant, it is granted far more 
often in favor of defendants, closing the courthouse door on the plaintiff’s 
claims.103  Summary judgments are sought in all types of federal cases.  But, 
according to the Federal Judicial Center, summary judgment motions by 
defendants are far more common in employment discrimination cases than 
in other cases; 35 percent in employment cases as opposed to 10 percent in 
contract claims and 11 percent in torts, for example.104  When defendants are 
granted motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs are denied the ability to 
take discovery and to present their claims to a jury.105  While the growing 
use of summary judgment to bar plaintiffs’ claims is disturbing in many 
contexts,106 it has a harshly disproportionate impact on gender equality 
claims.107  
Similarly, in 2009, the Court made it more difficult to sue in federal court 
by requiring that plaintiffs demonstrate that their claims are “plausible” 
rather than simply describing the case in sufficient detail to put the defendant 
on notice.108  Whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a 
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense.”109  If the judge finds the claim to be 
“implausible,” it must be dismissed.  In criticizing this decision, many have 
observed “judicial experience and common sense” has often been deaf, blind, 
and worse to the experience of women.110 
Other seemingly neutral technical “procedural” decisions have made it 
more difficult for women to challenge discriminatory workplace practices.  
For example, in 2011, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,111 the Court, in a 
5-4 decision, dramatically restricted the ability to bring antidiscrimination 
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claims as a class.112  Wal-Mart is the largest private employer in the United 
States, employing more than one million people in over 3000 stores.113  
Plaintiffs presented statistical data showing that women filled 65 percent of 
the hourly jobs at Wal-Mart but only 33 percent of management positions.114  
Affidavits from 121 prospective class members documented explicit gender 
bias.115  Plaintiffs challenged company-wide policies giving its mostly male 
managers broad discretion over pay and promotions.116  The trial court 
certified a proposed class, finding evidence that the gender disparity resulted 
from subjective the selection process117 combined with a centrally controlled 
corporate culture and micromanagement that promoted gender 
stereotypes.118  A panel of the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit en banc, 
affirmed.119 
The Court reversed in a 5-4 decision.  Justice Antonin Scalia, for the 
majority, found that a policy of subjective discretion is not a uniform 
employment practice that provides the necessary commonality for class 
certification.120  Justice Ginsburg dissented, observing that “[t]he risk of 
discrimination is heightened when . . . managers are predominantly of one 
sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture that perpetuates gender 
stereotypes.”121  As Michele E. Gilman observes, 
[E]xtensive research establishes that subjective, discretionary personnel 
practices contribute to pay disparities.  Despite these modern 
understandings of discrimination, Justice Scalia was wedded to old-
fashioned notions that focus solely on the employer’s state of mind rather 
than on how unconscious bias interacts with organizational structures to 
allow unchecked stereotypes to determine employment outcomes.122 
For yet another example of how the interpretation of seemingly neutral 
procedural rules can undermine legislative and popular efforts to enforce 
long-standing gender and racial pay equity norms and other workers’ rights, 
consider the question of whether employers can demand that workers forfeit 
rights to seek collective arbitration or class action remedies for shared 
grievances.  In recent years, employers increasingly demand, as a condition 
of employment, that employees waive rights to sue for violation of federal or 
state laws or contract terms and, rather, insist that employees rely on 
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individual arbitration.123  “Agreements” to arbitrate conflicts resulting from 
employment are placed in the small print of a job application, a slip of paper 
in a paycheck envelope, the employment handbook, or a severance 
agreement.  Mandatory arbitration clauses cover at least thirty million 
employees.124  Such “contracts” often seem inconsistent with basic common-
law rules prohibiting agreements so unfair as to be “unconscionable” or 
contracts of “adhesion” in which a powerful party forces unfair terms on a 
weaker party.125  Further, collective remedies, whether in courts or in 
arbitration, are often the only effective means to effectuate rights where 
individual claims are relatively small.  If the value of the individual claim is 
less than the costs of enforcement, claims will be heard only if brought in the 
aggregate.  In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,126 the Court considered employee 
claims of “wage theft”—that their employers underpaid them in violation of 
the wage and hours prescriptions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.127  
Employers required workers to sign “agreements” waiving their rights to 
seek collective judicial or arbitral remedies.128  Two federal laws speak to 
the question.129  The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA) allows disputes 
related to contract agreements to be settled through arbitration outside the 
judicial process.130  Second, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 
(NLRA) protects employees’ “right to self-organize” and to engage in 
“concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection.”131 
Justice Gorsuch, for the majority, held that the FAA expressed a strong 
“federal policy favoring arbitration” and that the NLRA’s protection of 
“other concerted activities” did not include class litigation or arbitration.132  
Justice Ginsburg, for four, protested that the FAA was intended to support 
the ability of businesses to enter into informed agreements to arbitrate, not 
this arm-twisting “take-it-or-leave-it” contract.133  Federal labor law protects 
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collective action and does not countenance such isolation of employees.134  
Justice Ginsburg observed that “[t]he inevitable result of today’s decision 
will be the underenforcement of federal and state statutes designed to 
advance the well-being of vulnerable workers.”135  Violations of minimum-
wage and overtime laws are widespread, and government agencies rely on 
private parties to enforce them.136  She noted that Congress also relied on 
private enforcement to assure compliance with federal civil rights laws and 
suggested that “it would be grossly exorbitant to read the FAA to devastate 
Title VII . . . and other laws enacted to eliminate, root and branch, class-
based employment discrimination.”137  It remains unclear how the decision 
might impact claims of gender and race discrimination otherwise prohibited 
by Title VII. 
As Justice Ginsburg did in her dissent from the majority’s decision to deny 
Lilly Ledbetter the right to sue for decades of illegal pay discrimination, she 
called on Congress to act: 
[T]he edict that employees with wage and hours claims may seek relief only 
one-by-one does not come from Congress.  It is the result of take-it-or-
leave-it labor contracts and of the readiness of this Court to enforce those 
unbargained-for agreements.  The FAA demands no such suppression of 
the right of workers to take concerted action for their “mutual aid or 
protection.”138 
Labor unions,139 newspapers,140 and others141 have taken up the call. 
III.  SOME PATHS FORWARD TO CLOSING DISCRIMINATORY 
INCOME GAPS 
Since the Civil War, advocates for civil rights and equality have looked 
first to the federal government for redress.  Since the 2016 election, and for 
the foreseeable future, the most that can be expected of the federal courts is 
adherence to established precedent and enforcement of rules clearly 
articulated by Congress.  Advocates for civil rights and equality, and those 
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who teach them, need to learn dramatic new ways of thinking and action, 
including organizing, state and local lawmaking, and leadership by 
progressive private enterprises.  This Part suggests paths forward, relying on 
transparency and collective action on individual, workplace, community, 
local, and state levels.  Recognizing that the United States has lagged far 
behind other developed countries in addressing discriminatory economic 
disparity, this Part looks to other models to identify what is feasible and the 
large positive impact of greater economic equality on overall productivity 
and well-being.  The information revolution, while creating huge challenges, 
facilitates transparency and collective action at every level from the personal 
to the global. 
Every story of a successful challenge to the gender wage gap begins with 
a woman discovering that she is earning less than a male colleague who does 
similar, or less demanding, work.  There is a strong social norm against 
discussing wages.142  A common explanation is that it is a matter of 
etiquette.143  Disclosing high pay can be seen as bragging, while disclosing 
low pay may feel embarrassing, as though it is revealing something about 
one’s worth.144  Pay secrecy may be an aspect of America’s social and 
cultural values regarding privacy.145  While it seems plain that there has been 
a social taboo against revealing wages and wealth, the reasons for it are far 
from obvious.  Further, it seems that younger generations are less likely to 
share the norm against discussing wages,146 in part because the internet 
accustoms people to sharing large swaths of data.147 
Far more important than uncertain and perhaps changing social norms, 
workers do not discuss their pay because they believe that they are prohibited 
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from doing so.  In the private sector in 2010, 62 percent of women and 60 
percent of men reported that their employer discouraged or prohibited the 
sharing of wage information and that the violation can lead to punishment.148  
In the public sector, only 18 percent of women and 11 percent of men report 
that discussion of wage or salary information is discouraged or prohibited.149 
Informed academics and practitioners assert that the NLRA protects the 
right of covered workers to share information about wages and salary.150  
How do we understand the disparity between the federal legal rule protecting 
workers’ right to share pay information and the widely held belief that one 
might get fired for doing so?  While forbidding employee discussion about 
pay may be illegal under the NLRA,151 this law is rarely enforced, the 
penalties are de minimis, most workers do not know that the law might offer 
protection, and they have no capacity to enforce whatever rights they might 
have.152 
Individual sharing of information and experience is a key first step, both 
daunting and insufficient.  Aggregated, transparent information is also 
essential.  In signing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, the Obama 
administration recognized that the statute of limitations was only one small 
piece of the answer to the multiple problems of discriminatory pay.153  The 
administration, after notice and comment, issued regulations requiring 
employees with at least 100 workers to include aggregate, anonymous 
information about pay for categories of employees on forms they already 
submit with information on sex, race, and ethnicity.154  The Obama 
regulations were very limited and only allowed access to researchers and 
EEOC enforcers.  In 2017, before the regulations went into effect, the Trump 
administration suspended them without notice or comment.155 
Congress has considered very modest proposals to address these issues.  
The Paycheck Fairness Act, considered between 2013 and 2017, would have 
prohibited employer retaliation against employee discussion of wages and 
require the EEOC to collect compensation and employment data 
disaggregated by sex, race, and national origin, available for research and 
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federal enforcement purposes but not to the public or individual workers.156  
The proposed law was rejected by party-line votes.157 
Information about wages is available for a large segment of workers, 
including unionized workers, federal employees, state workers in a number 
of states, and workers in some private enterprises.158  The evidence, while 
complex and imperfect, shows that wage transparency reduces wage 
disparity.159  For example, a large study by the U.S. General Accountability 
Office published in 2009 showed that, between 1988 and 2017, under a 
regime of wage transparency, the wage gap in the federal workforce 
diminished from 28 cents to 11 cents on the dollar.160  While factors other 
than wage transparency may explain part of the change, overall, the gender-
wage disparity is narrower in workplaces where wage information is readily 
available.161 
With the transformation of the federal courts, activists for civil rights and 
equality—and the law schools that train them—need to become more adept 
at seeking change at the state and local level.  Even in an era when Congress 
and the federal courts took primary responsibility for promoting civil rights 
and equality, state law often provided concrete remedies and models for 
federal change.162  Consider two well-known examples:  abortion funding 
and LGBTQ equality.  First, with respect to abortion funding, in 1980, the 
Court upheld the Hyde Amendment, which excludes payment for abortion 
from the otherwise comprehensive Medicaid program, which finances 
healthcare for millions of low-income women,163  At the federal level, that 
discriminatory rule has been extended to millions of others, including federal 
employees, military personnel, federal prisoners, and residents of the District 
of Columbia, and remains federal law today.164  Nonetheless, a majority of 
U.S. women now live in states in which Medicaid covers abortion with state 
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funds.165  While some states did that through legislative action, in others, 
state courts held that funding discrimination was prohibited by state 
constitutions.166 
LGBTQ equality provides a second example.  In 1986, the Court in Bowers 
v. Hardwick167 held that nothing in the federal constitution prevented 
Georgia from criminally prosecuting adults who engaged in private, 
consensual sexual activity with a person of the same sex.168  Over the next 
decades, enormous popular movement persuaded localities, states, private 
enterprises, and state courts interpreting state constitutions to reject 
discrimination against LGBTQ people, including discriminatory exclusion 
from marriage.169  The Court overruled Bowers in 2003170 and, in 2015, 
recognized that denying same-sex couples the right to marry violates the 
federal constitution.171  The state-level struggles for equality for poor women 
seeking abortions and for liberty and equality for LGBTQ people provide 
models for fights for gender pay equality. 
States, cities, unions, and private employers are now considering new 
approaches to address the gender pay gap:  prohibitions on employer 
questions about prior salaries, more effective prohibitions on punishment for 
worker pay disclosure, broader promotion of pay transparency, and an 
invigorated form of comparable worth.172 
Gender pay equity proponents argue that, given the substantial evidence 
of the persistent gender pay gap, employers should not be allowed to ask job 
applicants about prior salaries and that to do so violates the existing Equal 
Pay Act.173  In 2000, the EEOC instructed that reliance on salary history does 
not, by itself, legally justify paying women less.174  Several federal courts, 
including the Ninth Circuit, have rejected employers’ argument that basing 
pay on salary history alone is a neutral “factor other than sex” justifying 
paying women less and is lawful under the Equal Pay Act.175  Other federal 
courts have disagreed and the Court recently remanded the Ninth Circuit case 
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because it held that a circuit judge who died before the en banc decision was 
filed could not be counted in the en banc majority.176  Whatever the outcome 
under federal law, the issue is being debated in states and localities.  In 2016, 
Massachusetts became the first state to prohibit employers from seeking 
salary history from job applicants, and other cities, states, and counties across 
the country have followed suit.177 
As a second approach, some states and cities have adopted laws protecting 
wage-disclosing employees from retaliation that are much stronger than the 
ambiguous federal rule.178 
Third, Minnesota, Massachusetts, several Canadian provinces, and several 
European countries have required various forms of wage transparency.179  
After the Massachusetts law went into effect in July 2018, Elizabeth Rowe, 
a principal flutist of the Boston Symphony Orchestra, filed suit, complaining 
that she earned $70,000 a year less than her colleague, principal oboist John 
Ferrillo.180  Ferrillo supported her claim.181  Rowe and the Boston Symphony 
Orchestra settled in February 2019, but court documents did not provide the 
terms of the settlement.182 
Finally, comparable pay is another potential response, now rejected at the 
federal level.  In response to the comparable worth movement of the 1980s, 
many states adopted laws requiring that men and women be paid equally for 
comparable work.183  But state courts often interpreted these statutes as 
requiring no more than the federal Equal Pay Act.184  Since the Trump 
election, legislators in forty states have considered proposals to strengthen 
state protections to promote equal pay for comparable worth.185  Stephanie 
Bornstein identifies three state laws in California, Massachusetts, and 
Oregon as offering the strongest protections to remedy both gender and racial 
pay gaps.186  These laws are just now going into effect, and it is too soon to 
know whether they will be promote equal pay for comparable worth. 
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The fourth, and perhaps the most likely to be most effective, response to 
the gender pay disparity gap is not commanded by federal or state law but 
rather voluntarily undertaken by unions and employers. It is recognizing the 
value of paying people on the basis of performance and contribution and 
acknowledging our common, often unconscious, history of racial and gender 
discrimination.  Unions have long conducted comparable pay studies and 
have sometimes persuaded employers to implement them.187  Similarly, 
some companies and private organizations have undertaken comparable 
worth studies and adjusted pay accordingly.188 
In 2016, the Obama administration announced a White House “Equal Pay 
Pledge” for private sector companies committed to equal pay for their 
employees.  These companies committed to conducting annual gender pay 
analyses across occupations, reviewing hiring and promotion processes and 
procedures to reduce unconscious bias and structural barriers, and embedding 
equal pay efforts into broader company initiatives.189  Simmons College now 
hosts the Employers for Pay Equity Consortium.  As of September 2018, 
more than thirty-five companies had joined the consortium, including Delta 
Airlines, Deloitte, Facebook, Gap Inc., General Motors, Johnson & Johnson, 
Microsoft, PepsiCo, and Staples.190  The information revolution of the 
twenty-first century allows workers to aggregate information online to 
develop metrics of corporate responsibility, including wage fairness, and to 
disseminate them broadly.191 
We need a popular movement against wage inequality.  Popular 
movements often begin with individuals sharing experiences that were 
previously secret.  Think, for example, of the #MeToo and Time’s Up 
movements; advocacy for reproductive justice, LGBTQ rights, and marriage 
equality; and feminist and antiracism activism more generally.  Sharing 
individual experience is essential, but not alone sufficient for change.  
Second, we then need systematic, aggregated, accessible information to 
understand the nature and depth of the wage gap problems, both for women 
and other historically disfavored groups.  Third, we need stronger substantive 
norms and remedies to enforce them.  As a practical matter, these need to be 
created by state and local governments, unions, and enlightened private 
organizations.  Global information allows us to learn from the examples of 
others. 
CONCLUSION 
In closing, I want to share more stories particularly relevant to the 
celebration of 100 years of women at Fordham Law School.  In May 2018, 
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the University of Denver agreed to pay $2.66 million to compensate the 
women faculty of the Sturm College of Law for the gap between their pay 
and that of male colleagues doing equal work since 1973.192  The Law School 
has a “boldly progressive reputation”193 and has long been home to leading 
feminist scholars.194  The Law School agreed to a six-year monitoring 
plan.195  A highly reliable source told me of another recent, similarly 
dramatic settlement at a second U.S. law school.  It included a confidentiality 
agreement prohibiting those involved from discussing the case, and so I am 
not able to share the details.  While it is impossible to know, I believe that 
the pattern revealed in these two schools is the norm, not the exception, in 
private law schools. 
My hope is that, in this conference, we can make change by talking with 
one another and our male colleagues, demanding transparency in our own 
institutions, and, if problems are revealed, achieving change.  More 
importantly, legal scholars and educators have a special ability, and perhaps 
responsibility, to take on the challenge of addressing the issues of illegal and 
unjust gender and race wage disparities in less rarified workplaces, where the 
money matters even more to those on the short end of the stick.  Finally, and 
most ambitiously, my dream is that by focusing on these issues in the 
relatively simple context of gender pay disparity, we can begin to address the 
larger issues of the vast and growing disparity of income, wealth, and 
opportunity in the United States. 
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